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Abstract 
Should public investment be targeted to big cities or to small towns, if the objective is to 
minimize national poverty? To answer this policy question we extend the basic Todaro-type 
model of rural-urban migration to the case of migration from rural areas to two potential 
destinations, secondary town and big city. We first derive conditions under which a poverty 
gradient from rural to town to city will exist as an equilibrium phenomenon. We then develop 
sufficient statistics for the policy decisions based on these income parameters. The empirical 
remit of the model is illustrated with long running panel data from Kagera, Tanzania. Further, we 
show that the structure of the sufficient statistics is maintained in the case where the model is 
generalized to introduce heterogeneous workers and jobs. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Should public investment be targeted to big cities or to small towns, if the objective is to 
minimize national poverty? This perennial policy question has grown in importance as the debate 
on “megacities versus secondary towns” has intensified (Christiaensen and Kanbur, 2016). A 
first cut answer to this question might look at which location had greater poverty. If there is a 
declining poverty gradient from towns to cities, an initial answer might be to invest in secondary 
towns for poverty reduction.  
 
 But it should be clear that a more considered answer to the question depends on at least 
three factors. First, what will be the first round impact, on income distribution and poverty, of 
public investment in either location? Here the poverty gradient may give us an initial clue. But, 
second, how will this first round impact change the attractiveness of migration to cities and 
towns from rural areas? And third, how will this migration in turn affect income distribution in 
cities and towns, and thence migration and distribution in subsequent rounds? The key point is 
that any public investment will induce a reallocation of population, and any assessment of the 
impact of public investment on national income distribution and thus national poverty will have 
to model the new migration equilibrium. Indeed, the poverty gradient will itself be an 
equilibrium phenomenon, taking into account migration responses to income differentials. 
 
 There are thus many moving parts in attempting to provide an answer to the basic 
question. Our focus in this paper will be on migration equilibrium, population reallocation and 
the national income distribution, for given efficiency of investment in big cities versus small 
towns. Migration equilibrium has of course been a staple of development theory since the 
seminal papers of Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970). In these papers there are two 
sectors (“rural”, naturally thought of as the location of origin in migration, and “urban”, thought 
of as the destination location).  Location choice is determined by economic prospects in the two 
sectors and equilibrium is attained when there are no private incentives to migrate from one 
location to another.  
 
 As is now well known, in the standard formulation of the Todaro/Harris-Todaro model 
the rural prospect is a certain income while the urban prospect consists of a higher than rural 
income (“modern sector employment”) with a probability, and a lower than rural income 
(“unemployment” or “informality”) otherwise. Equilibrium in a model with identical agents is 
described by indifference to location, and is attained by endogenous adjustment of the urban 
prospect (changes in the unemployment rate) as population relocates. With fixed incomes in the 
rural sector, in modern employment and in unemployment, and a fixed number of jobs in the 
urban modern sector, the equilibrium outcomes are determined by these incomes and the number 
of jobs, and by the degree of risk aversion (the base assumption is usually one of risk neutrality). 
 
 The basic model has endured as a platform for analysis and debate despite its simplified 
nature. From this base, one strand of the literature has progressively complicated the urban 
prospects, for example by introducing different features of an informal sector including 
endogeneity of income. Further complications like skill acquisition while waiting for a modern 
sector job, which brings into play dynamic considerations, have also been introduced. A recent 
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example of this development, which also has references to previous work in this tradition, is 
Basu, Chau, Fields and Kanbur (2016). 
 
 How about income distribution? With the basic set up, income distribution is determined 
by the migration equilibrium, which gives the share of population at each of the three income 
levels—rural, modern employment and unemployment/informal. Comparative statics on this 
income distribution has been a staple in the literature. For example, in an early contribution, 
Anand and Kanbur (1985) trace out the implications of increasing the urban modern wage or the 
number of urban modern jobs. More recently, papers such as those by Temple (2005) and 
Temple and Ying (2014) continue this tradition of tracing out the evolution of income 
distribution in a two-sector model of population reallocation between agriculture and non-
agriculture under different economic environments. 
 
 There is thus a strong tradition of analyzing migration equilibrium and income 
distribution in the setting of two sector Todaro/Harris-Todaro type models. However, the key is 
that these are two sector models—typically a rural sector and an urban sector. The question of 
big cities versus small towns simply cannot be posed in such models because there is only a 
single urban sector encompassing the two. In order to answer the question posed at the start of 
this paper, on whether poverty reduction is best served by public investment in cities or in towns, 
we clearly need a model in which the urban sector is so disaggregated. The migration 
equilibrium will then have to encompass population allocation in three locations—one rural and 
two urban. And the national income distribution will now be more complex, taking into account 
income and respective population shares at each of the income levels in the three locations. 
 
 Multiple destinations are also a staple of the rural-urban migration literature. For 
example, Fafchamps and Shilpi (2013) is only one of the recent additions to the literature, 
looking at the choice of migration destination in Nepal using two rounds of the Living Standards 
Survey. But, like that paper, nearly all of this strand of the literature is empirical and econometric 
in nature, and there is no focus on the distributional implications of a multiple destinations 
model. The missing piece of the puzzle, then, is indeed a model of migration equilibrium and 
income distribution with multiple destinations. 
 
 The object of this paper is, first of all, to develop a Todaro-type model of migration 
equilibrium and income distribution where rural migrants face two urban destinations—a big city 
and a secondary town, each with its own stylized prospects. This is done in Section 2. Section 3 
examines the properties of such an equilibrium focusing on the nature of the distributional 
differences between the three locations—specifically on whether there is a “poverty gradient” 
from rural to towns to cities, as has been found in the empirical literature (Ferre, Ferreira and 
Lanjouw, 2012). Section 4 turns to the motivating question of this paper—should public 
investment be targeted to towns or cities, if the objective is poverty reduction? This is analyzed 
in terms of the impact of job creation in the town or in the city. Conditions under which one or 
the other policy stance dominates are then derived. Section 5 then presents an empirical 
illustration of our arguments with long running panel data from Kagera, Tanzania. Section 6 
extends the simple, identical agents, model of the previous sections to the case where agents are 
heterogeneous. It is shown that heterogeneity complicates the picture but the basic economic 
forces identified in the previous analyses still hold sway. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
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2. Model and Equilibrium 
 
 We consider an extension of the basic Todaro (1969) model by introducing two potential 
destinations for out-migration from the rural area – small town and city.  Rural, small town and 
city are identified by subscripts r, s and c, respectively.  In each destination the migrant faces a 
prospect of getting a high paying modern sector job with wage w (ws, wc), or ending up 
unemployed with a low paying informal sector income wo (wos, woc).  The probability of securing 
modern sector job is e (es , ec).  There is a single rural sector income which is certain, and 
denoted wr. Incomes in the model are exogenously given. 
 
 Total population is 𝑁𝑁�, and the populations of the three sectors are denoted Nr, Ns and Nc.  
Modern sector employment is denoted by E (Es, Ec) and informal sector employment (or 
unemployment) is denoted U (Us, Uc).  Throughout we treat the words “unemployment” and 
“informal employment” as synonymous. Thus 
 
 𝑁𝑁� = Nr + Ns + Nc (1)  
 Ns = Es + Us (2) 
 Nc = Ec + Uc (3) 
 
 Further, as in the classic Todaro (1969) formulation, the probability of getting a modern 
sector job in a destination is identified with the modern sector employment rate in that 
destination: 
 
 es = Es / Ns (4) 
 ec = Ec / Nc (5) 
 
The “unemployment rate” is then the fraction of the population in the informal sector. 
 
 us = 1 – es (6) 
 uc = 1 – ec (7) 
 
 We come now to the migration decisions and migration equilibrium in this model with a 
single origin and two destinations.  The agent in the rural sector faces the choice of staying in the 
rural sector with income wr, migrating to the small town for a prospect of ws with probability es 
and wos with probability 1 – es , or migrating to the city for a prospect of wc with probability ec, 
and woc with probability 1 – ec.  In addition, we suppose that there is a “migration cost” for each 
destination, denoted 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠∗ and 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗.  These can be transportation costs to, and settlement and job 
search costs in, each of the destinations.1  We assume that 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗ > 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠∗. 
                                                          
1 In practice, transport costs are often only a fraction of the annual income gain that could be obtained from moving. 
Among migrants for Kagera, in northern Tanzania, Christiaensen, De Weerdt and Kanbur (2017) show for example 
that transport costs to towns were only about 22 percent of the average annual income gain from informal 
employment in towns (wos), and only 14 percent from the average income gain from informal employment in the 
city (woc). Schwartz (1973) alerted us to this already early on. In her paper, “Interpreting the effect of distance on 
migration”, she shows that the adverse effect of distance on migration follows especially from diminishing-
information (i.e. rising jobs search costs), and less likely from actual transport (or psychic costs). Migration costs, 
ti*, thus reflect both transport costs to, as well as settlement and jobs search costs in the destinations. This makes it 
also more likely that the interior equilibrium migration conditions hold empirically (see equations (18) and (19)). As 
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 In a two period framework we assume that the costs of migration are paid in the first 
period and the benefits come in the second period. Let the discount factor be δ. We make the 
Todaro assumption that the agent is risk neutral so the migration decision depends on the 
comparison: 
 
 wr  + δwr ⋛  wr – 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠∗ + δ [es ws + (1 – es) wos] 
 
for the secondary town and the corresponding comparison for the city. Rearranging terms, the 
comparison becomes: 
 
wr  + 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠∗/δ   ⋛   [es ws + (1 – es) wos] 
 
Let  
 
 ts = 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠∗/δ  
 
be the discounted migration cost and let the corresponding term for city be 
 
tc = 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐∗/δ  
Then all of the relevant comparisons can be written as follows: 
 
 
  wr    ⋛    es ws + (1 – es ) wos – ts (8) 
  
 wr     ⋛     ec wc + (1 – ec) wos – tc (9) 
      
 es ws + (1 – es) wos – ts   ⋛    ec wc + (1 – ec) wos – tc (10) 
       
 It should be clear that we will not get an interior solution to population allocation if any 
of the inequalities hold strictly – one or two of the three locations will have zero population in 
that case.  For an interior equilibrium, we thus require the core conditions: 
 
 wr  =  es ws + (1 – es) wos – ts  =  ec wc + (1 – ec) wos – tc (11) 
 
or 
 wr + tc  =  ec wc + (1 – ec) woc (12) 
 
 wr + ts  =  es ws + (1 – es) wos (13) 
 
 As in the basic Todaro model, we take wr, ws, wos, ts, Es, wc, woc, tc, Ec to be fixed.  The 
variables es and ec adjust to satisfy the equilibrium conditions (12) and (13).  These together with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the migration costs tend to increase with distance to the destination, they could also be seen as a proxy for 
distance/proximity. The critical role of distance in understanding migration patterns is also longstanding in the 
literature (see for example Sjaastad (1962) for an early discussion).  
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(1) – (7) determine population allocation across the different locations and income levels.  In 
other words, the full equilibrium income distribution in the current period can now be specified. 
 
 Solving (12) and (13), in conjunction with (1) – (7), gives us the following equilibrium 
values: 
 
 es = 
𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟+𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠− 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠   ;     us = 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠−𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟−𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠  (14) 
  
 Ns =�
𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟+ 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠− 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠� 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 ; Us = � 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠− 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟−𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟+ 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠� 𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 (15) 
 
 ec = 
𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟+ 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 −𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐
𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐− 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐   ;  uc = 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐− 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟− 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐− 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐   (16) 
 
 Nc = �
𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐
𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟+ 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐− 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐� 𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐  ;  Uc = � 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐− 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟−𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟+ 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐� 𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐 (17) 
 
 
The equilibrium rural population is then given by using (15) and (17) in (1). 
 
 The equilibrium values in (14) – (17) are thus determined by the exogenous parameters.  
However, the two employment rates clearly need to lie between zero and one, and this restricts 
the range of parameter values. 
 
 1 > es > 0   <=>   ws > wr + ts > wos (18) 
 
 1 > ec > 0   <=>   wc > wr + tc > woc (19)  
 
The full equilibrium and its income distribution are now pinned down. What are its properties? 
 
3. Poverty Gradients 
 
 The equilibrium income distribution in this model consists of five incomes and their 
associated populations: 
 
  (wr, Nr);  (ws, Es);  (wos, Us);  (wc, Ec);  (woc, Uc) (20) 
 
Nr, Us and Uc are endogenous equilibrium variables derived from equations (1), (15) and (17).  
The population shares are simply (Nc / 𝑁𝑁), (Es / 𝑁𝑁), (Us / 𝑁𝑁), (Ec / 𝑁𝑁) and (Uc / 𝑁𝑁).  We can now 
investigate the properties of the equilibrium income distribution. 
 
 Consider first the observed mean income in the secondary town and city, sµ and rµ
respectively: 
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  cµ = ec wc + (1 – ec) woc = wr + tc 
   
  ⋛  wr + ts = ec wc + (1 – ec) woc = sµ  
   
  <=> 
   
  tc ⋛  ts  (21) 
 
Thus the basic stylized fact, observed almost universally, that mean income in the city exceeds 
mean income in town, requires that the cost of migration to the city is greater than the cost of 
migration to the town. From now on we will assume that this is the case. 
 
 What about the poverty comparison between rural, town and city?  Is there a poverty 
gradient? This depends on where exactly the poverty line lies relative to the five incomes and 
how the five incomes lie relative to each other.  We assume that the ranking of the five incomes 
is as follows: 
 
  wr < wos < woc < ws < wc (22) 
 
In other words, the lowest income is in the rural area and the highest is in the city modern sector.  
The modern sector income in the secondary town is less than modern sector income in the city, 
but it is greater than informal income in the city.  Informal income in the city is greater than 
informal income in the secondary town, which is in turn greater than rural income.  We can now 
consider different cases as the poverty line is increased progressively to cover a larger and larger 
share of the national population. 
 
 We focus on poverty as measured by the FGT class of poverty indices Pα.  Denote the 
poverty line by z.  Then if incomes are wi for i = 1, 2, 3 …, n individuals in the society, 
 
𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼 =   1𝑛𝑛 � �𝑧𝑧 − 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧 �α 
𝑖𝑖 
𝑠𝑠.𝑡𝑡.  𝑧𝑧>𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖
 
As is well known, α is the degree of poverty aversion.  When α = 0, we recover the standard 
poverty head count ratio.  When α = 1, we have the poverty gap measure.  As α increases 
beyond 1, the index gives more and more weight to the poorest of the poor. 
 
 We now consider poverty across the different groups for progressively higher poverty 
lines. The first case is where  
 
  wr < z < wos < woc < ws < wc (24) 
 
In this case there is poverty in the rural sector but not in either of the two urban locations. There 
is thus a rural-urban poverty gradient but no such gradient between town and city.  So consider 
the second case, where 
 
  wr < wos < z < woc < ws < wc (25) 
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Poverty in the three locations – r, s and c, – is given by 
 
               
  Pα,r = �
𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
   (26) 
 
            
  Pα,s = 𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠 �
𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤0𝑠𝑠
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
    
                                         
    =  �𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠−𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟−𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠
�    �𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
 (27) 
  
  Pα,c = 0 (28) 
 
Let us compare Pα,r and Pα,s.  When α = 0, the head count ratio is 100% in the rural sector but 
less than 100% in the secondary town, and it is zero in the city.  Thus there is a clear declining 
poverty gradient in the equilibrium, as has been found empirically by Ferrer, Ferreira and 
Lanjouw (2012).  The same holds true for α = 1 because not only are a small proportion of the 
secondary town’s population in poverty, the depth of their poverty is smaller.  For this same 
reason, Pα,s is lower than Pα,r for all α.  There is thus a clear poverty gradient from r, to s, to c. 
 
 Now consider a third case where both the urban informal sectors are in poverty: 
 
  wr < wos < woc < z < ws < wc (29) 
 
 
In this case: 
                                  
  Pα,r =  �
𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
   (30) 
 
                                   
  Pα,s =  �
𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠−𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟−𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠
� �
𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
   (31) 
   
                    
  Pα,c = uc �𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤0𝑐𝑐𝑧𝑧 �𝛼𝛼   
                              
   =  �𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐−𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟−𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐
𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐
� �
𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤0𝑐𝑐
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
 (32) 
 
 
When α = 0, the highest poverty is once again in the rural sector.  But the comparison between 
Pα,s and Pα,c essentially comes down to which location has the higher unemployment rate (or 
fraction of population in informality) since given the poverty line this is in fact the poverty rate. 
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 The comparison of unemployment rates in this case is ambiguous. An examination of 
(14) and (16) shows that there are three opposing forces that determine unemployment: (i) higher 
migration costs (transport, search and settlement) lower unemployment, (ii) a higher gap between 
the formal wage and the rural wage increases unemployment and (iii) a higher gap between the 
formal and informal sector lowers unemployment. While higher migration costs and lower 
informal wages unambiguously lower unemployment in the model, the role of formal income 
appears ambiguous. On the one hand a high formal wage raises the gap with the rural wage 
(increasing unemployment) and on the other hand it raises the gap with the informal wage 
(reducing unemployment).  Taking the derivative, 
 
𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝑐𝑐
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐
= 𝜕𝜕[(𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐−𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟−𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐(𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐) ]
𝜕𝜕𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐
= (𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟+𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐)(𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐)2  , 
 
which is positive given (19), it can however be seen that, in the model, higher formal wages 
come along with larger unemployment rates (and lower formal wages with lower unemployment 
rates). 
 Thus a falling P0 poverty gradient for rural to town to city then becomes more likely 
when cities have higher migration costs, lower formal sector wage gaps with the rural wage and 
higher formal-informal wage gaps (or when cities have higher migration costs and lower 
informal and formal wages, which all discourage city migration, in turn leading to lower city 
unemployment and poverty). And if the gradient holds for P0 it will also hold for P1 and for all α 
greater than 1, given that (z – wos) > (z – woc). Hence, under certain conditions there will again be 
a general poverty gradient from rural, through secondary town, to big city.  
 
 
4. Job Creation and Poverty Reduction 
 
  
 Consider now the motivating policy question of whether the government should invest in 
small towns or big cities.  We specify this in the context of our model as a policy of increasing 
formal sector jobs in either of the two locations.  If the objective is to reduce national poverty, 
will the impact be greater with an increase of Es or an increase of Ec? Of course the final answer 
to the policy question will depend on the costs of creating a job in the town versus the city. That 
is not the focus of this paper, but the answers we provide will can be used to benchmark the cost 
differential which will flip the targeting of public investment in one direction or the other. 
 
 Let us start again, with scenario (24), where the poverty line is so low that the only 
poverty is in rural areas.  Then national poverty is simply 
 
             
  Pα =  
𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟
𝑁𝑁�
   �𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
                                      
  = 1
𝑁𝑁�
   [𝑁𝑁� − 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠 − 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐] �𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧 �𝛼𝛼 
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  =1
𝑁𝑁�
�𝑁𝑁� −
𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 − 𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐� �𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟𝑧𝑧 �𝛼𝛼 (33) 
   
Differentiating (33), we get 
 
 
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃α
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠
⋚
𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃α
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐
 
 
<=> 
 1/𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 ⋛ 1/𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐 
 
<=> 
 
𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠 −  𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 +  𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 − 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 ⋛ 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 −  𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 + 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 −  𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 
 
           (34) 
                       
 
Thus the poverty reduction is greatest (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑α
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠
  is more negative) where the employment rate is 
smallest or the informality rate is largest (1/𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠 is largest).  The intuition behind this is as follows.  
Each new job of course attracts a migrant.  But it also attracts, in equilibrium, additional 
migrants drawn by the higher probability of getting a job. At the margin, the number of 
additional migrants attracted is inversely proportional to the employment rate in the location—
the lower the employment rate, the more additional migrants are attracted (from (15) and (17): 
dNi/dEi=1/ei). Even if the additional migrants end up in the informal sector, in the scenario 
depicted in (24), they are still above the poverty line.  
 
With migration costs to towns typically substantially lower than to cities (ts<<tc), favoring 
migration to towns, the formal employment rate is likely to be lower in towns (unless offset by 
much higher wage differentials in the cities compared to the towns), as can be seen from 
comparing (14) and (16). Under such a scenario, poverty reduction from employment generation 
in towns would be larger than from employment generation in the city.  
 
 Scenario (25), where only the rural income and small town informal income are below 
the poverty line, is a relatively straightforward case where the inherent advantage of the city 
drives the results. In this case there is no poverty in the city. Any migration induced to the city 
informal sector from job creation in the city modern sector will reduce P0. But the same is not 
true for the small town, since its informal sector income is below the poverty line. Thus job 
creation in the city will always dominate for poverty reduction as measured by change in P0. The 
same holds true for P1 since wos is less than z. 
 
 Let us now turn to scenario (29) where rural income and both of the urban informal 
incomes are below the poverty line.  In this case: 
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  Pα =  
𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟
𝑁𝑁�
  �𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
    
  
                           
       +  𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠
𝑁𝑁�
 �𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
 
 
                           
       +  𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐
𝑁𝑁�
�
𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤0𝑐𝑐
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
 
        
                                              
       =   �𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
 
 
                                                                                                   
       −  (𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠
𝑁𝑁�
) �𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
 −  (𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐
𝑁𝑁�
) �𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
     
 
                                                             
       −  (𝑈𝑈𝑠𝑠
𝑁𝑁�
) ��𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
− �
𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤0𝑠𝑠
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
�     
 
                                                  
          −  (𝑈𝑈𝑐𝑐
𝑁𝑁�
) ��𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
− �
𝑧𝑧− 𝑤𝑤0𝑐𝑐
𝑧𝑧
�
𝛼𝛼
� (35) 
 
 
This seemingly complicated expression simplifies when α = 0, to 
 
  𝑃𝑃0 = 1 − �𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁�� − �𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐𝑁𝑁� �  (36) 
 
Thus 
 
  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑o
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠
= 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑0
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐
= −�1
𝑁𝑁�
� (37) 
 
This should be clear intuitively as well.  This is a scenario where the only income above the 
poverty line are modern sector incomes in the two urban locations. Job creation either in the city 
or in town reduces poverty one for one.  There are migration consequences, of course, from rural 
areas to the informal sectors of the two destination locations. But all of these moves are below 
the poverty line. Since the index of poverty is the incidence or head count of poverty, these 
moves below the poverty line do not affect poverty at all. What is left is the effect of a new job in 
the modern sectors of the two locations, whose consequence for the numbers in poverty is 
identical. The choice thus depends only on the relative cost of creating jobs in either of the two 
locations, not on its poverty consequences. 
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 When α = 1 the complicated expression in (35) also simplifies, giving us: 
 
  P1 =   �
1
𝑧𝑧 𝑁𝑁� � {(𝑧𝑧 − 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟)𝑁𝑁� − 𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠 − 𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐}     
 
  𝑋𝑋𝑠𝑠 = (𝑤𝑤0𝑠𝑠−𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟)(𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠−𝑧𝑧)+𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠(𝑧𝑧−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠)𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟+𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠−𝑤𝑤0𝑠𝑠    
             
  𝑋𝑋𝑐𝑐 = (𝑤𝑤0𝑐𝑐−𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟)(𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐−𝑧𝑧)+𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐(𝑧𝑧−𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐)𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟+𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐−𝑤𝑤0𝑐𝑐    (38) 
 
Job creation in either sector reduces poverty, but the impact depends on relative magnitudes of 
the various income levels and the poverty line. 
 
  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
= − � 1
𝑧𝑧 𝑁𝑁� � 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖   ;   i = s, c (39) 
 
Thus, whether to invest in city or town depends on the relative magnitudes of Xs and Xc –these 
are the sufficient statistics for whether to create the marginal job in city or town. 
 The intuition behind expressions (38) and (39) is as follows. Creating a modern sector job 
in the city, say, reduces the poverty gap of a rural person by (z – wr). But this job creation also 
moves a number of people from the rural area to the urban informal sector. For each person so 
moved, the reduction in poverty gap is given by (woc – wr). The total number of persons moved 
to the city informal sector by creating one job in the modern city sector is given from (17) by (wc 
– wr -tc )/(wr + tc –woc). The reduction in poverty gap from moves to the informal sector is thus 
given by the product of these two expressions. The total reduction in poverty gap, from moves to 
the modern and the informal sector in the city as the result of creating one modern sector job is 
then (z – wr) + [(wc – wr -tc) /(wr + tc –woc)] (woc – wr), which is the expression Xc in (38). An 
analogous argument establishes the intuition  for Xs. 
The decline in poverty will be greater for modern job generation in the town if Xs > Xc, i.e. if  
 
𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠 –(𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟+𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)(𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 + 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠) –𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 (𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 − 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟) > 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 –(𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟+𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐)(𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 + 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐) –𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 (𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 − 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟)     (40) 
which is more likely if secondary town job generation induces more migration and the larger is 
the reduction in their poverty gap, i.e. the larger are wos and ws 2( and the smaller is ts 3. 
In conclusion, from this extended H-T model with two destinations and explicitly 
accounting for migration costs, we learn that, in general, to assess whether to invest in cities or 
towns for poverty reduction, we need to take into account many interactions. Especially, the 
migration response to job generation as a result of the investment is key. The poverty outcome 
                                                          
2 Or the smaller the difference with woc and wc respectively (recall from (22): wr < wos < woc < ws < wc) 
3 Compared to tc –note that dXs/dts<0. 
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depends further intimately on where the poverty line falls in relation to the income levels in cities 
and towns. Finally, the poverty index chosen to evaluate the poverty effects can also matter.  
For an empirically plausible income gradient scenario (wr < wos < woc < ws < wc) and 
three different locations of the poverty line within this gradient we have also derived exact 
conditions under which one or the other policy will dominate. For convenience, Table 1 
summarizes the findings, together with the associated poverty gradient. Given the importance of 
the migration response in determining the empirical outcome, migration costs and thus the 
proximity of the poor to towns versus cities, which is closely related to the migration cost they 
face (Schwarz, 1973), will play an important role (as will the difference in the income gaps 
between formal and informal employment across towns and cities).  
To add perspective, globally, a larger share of the population lives closer to secondary 
towns than to cities. While 15.9 percent live within 1-3 hours from a secondary town (defined as 
≤ 500,000 inhabitants), 9.9 percent live within 1-3 hours from a city (> 500,000 inhabitants); 
another 15.3 percent live in the rural hinterlands (at more than 3 hours from an urban center) 
(FAO, 2017). In Sub-Saharan Africa, which houses about half of the world’s extreme poor 
(World Bank, 2016), 22 percent of the population live within 1-3 hours from a secondary town, 
compared with 9 percent living within 1-3 hours from a city. About 1/3 of the rural population 
lives in the rural hinterland at more than 3 hours from an urban center (FAO, 2017). With 82 
percent of Africa’s poor living in rural areas (Beegle et al., 2016) and many of these closer to 
towns than to Africa’s cities, it becomes important for global poverty reduction to understand 
how distance and migration costs interact in practice with the difference in income gaps between 
formal and informal jobs in those towns and cities.
  
Table 1: Poverty gradient and poverty reduction from modern job generation under different positions of the poverty line in the 
income gradient 
Scenario Poverty gradient 
 
Poverty reduction from modern job generation  
 
(24): wr < z < wos < woc < ws < wc   Rural-Urban: Pα,r >Pα,s = Pα,c 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠
< 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐
:  greater in town if  1
𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑠
> 1
𝑒𝑒𝑐𝑐  <=> 𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠 −𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟+𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 −𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 > 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 −𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟+𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐 −𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 
 
 
(25): wr < wos < z < woc < ws < wc   Rural-Town-City: Pα,r > Pα,s > Pα,c 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠
> 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝛼𝛼
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐:  always greater in the city 
(29): wr < wos < woc < z < ws < wc   Rural-Town-City: Pα,r > [Pα,s > Pα,c] 
 
if us<uc <=>
𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠 −𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟−𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠
𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠 −𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 < 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 −𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟−𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐 −𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐  
 
α = 0:   no difference 
 
α = 1: 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑠𝑠
< 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝛼𝛼
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑐𝑐
, greater in town, if  
𝑤𝑤𝑠𝑠 – (𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 + 𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)(𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟  +  𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠) –𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 (𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑠 − 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟) > 𝑤𝑤𝑐𝑐  – (𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟 + 𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐)(𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟  +  𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐) –𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 (𝑤𝑤𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 − 𝑤𝑤𝑟𝑟) 
 5. An empirical illustration 
 
The Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS) provides an ideal opportunity to 
bring the model to the data and to begin to explore the empirical relevance of its insights. Under 
the KHDS, 915 households, sampled to be representative of (rural and urban) Kagera, a region in 
the north-western part of Tanzania, were first interviewed up to four times during 1991-1994. In 
2010 the survey attempted to trace and reinterview all 6,353 original household members, even if 
they had migrated or split off from the original household. By 2010 the original sample 
respondents had spread across Tanzania’s rural areas, towns and cities. This unique dataset is one 
of the longest-running panel data sets of individuals in Africa. By 2010, 68 percent (4,336) of the 
original household members were interviewed, 20 percent had died (1,275) and 12 percent were 
untraced (739). Out of the 4,336 respondents, comparable consumption data is available for 
4,323. With at least one person contacted in 92 percent of the initial households and only 12 
percent of individuals not found, survey attrition rates were extremely low, especially 
considering the long time period of 20 years.  
From the sample of 4,323 individuals we drop 313 who were already living in an urban 
area in 1991/94, leaving 4,010 individuals who originate from rural Kagera. Out of those 1,899 
migrated out of their original villages. Twenty years later, in 2010, we find 315 of these 
individuals had migrated to a city, 557 individuals to a town and 1,027 individuals to another 
rural area.4  Of the 2,111 individuals who did not move, 331 live in an area that got reclassified 
from rural to urban and we drop them from our analysis to avoid confusion. Virtually everyone 
in the rural areas is in the informal sector (only 3.5 percent rely on a formal wage job), so this 
group corresponds closely to the rural population we have in mind in the model.  In the towns, 
18.9 percent lives in a household that relies on formal wage employment. This rises to 22.2 
percent in the cities.5 
The 2010 income distribution of these individuals, could essentially be thought of as the 
migration equilibrium outcome of the rural population of Kagera in 1991 across the 3 
destinations, the rural area (i.e. no migration or another rural area), the secondary towns and the 
cities and across the informal and formal sectors within the two latter destinations. It provides an 
ideal backdrop to give empirical content to the findings of the model under the different 
scenarios considered (as summarized in Table 1) and explore the model’s empirical relevance.  
We begin by examining the income gradient observed in the data across the five different 
income groups considered in the model (informal rural employment, informal town employment, 
                                                          
4 We distinguish between urban and rural centers using the 2002 census classification. Urban centers with more than 
500,000 inhabitants are considered cities, the others are towns. Using this definition the cities are Dar es Salaam (the 
economic capital of Tanzania with an estimated 4.36 million people according to the 2012 census) and Mwanza 
(with an estimated 0.7 million inhabitants) 
5 Of the formally wage employed, 70 and 80 percent work in the private sector in towns and cities, respectively. In 
towns, 21 percent also work in the public sector, while that share is 11 percent in the cities. The remaining 7 percent 
work for NGOs or religious organizations, in both the towns and the city. 
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informal city employment, formal town employment, formal city employment). Given the 
difficulties in obtaining reliable income data in African settings, consumption per capita6, 
spatially deflated and expressed in 2010 Tanzanian Shilling (TSH), is taken as proxy for 
income.7  
Taking median incomes (in ‘000 TSH) of each group yields: wr= 372 < wos=613 < woc = 
871 < ws = 1,088 < wc = 1,475. This conforms with the income gradient assumed in the model. A 
similar gradient is observed when taking average incomes, which are more sensitive to outliers: 
wr= 495 < wos= 765 < woc = 1,063 < ws = 1,325 < wc = 1,605. Figure 1 overlays the cumulative 
density functions (cdf) for each of the 5 incomes  of interest and clearly shows a similar 
dominance pattern across the different distributions. For a largest part the income distributions 
first order dominate each other in the expected manner, with perhaps the only exception Ws 
crossing Woc in the left and right tail of the distribution.8  
Figure 1: Cumulative density function of income (2010) by income groups 
 
 
While the poverty line can be set at different levels (Ravallion, 2016), one natural anchor 
point, adopted as benchmark by the international community in the Sustainable Development 
                                                          
6 Similar results are obtained when using consumption per adult equivalent. 
7 For a detailed description of the data and the consumption variable construction, we refer to De Weerdt et al. 
(2012). 
8 Formal secondary town employment dominates informal city employment over most of the income range, except 
at the very bottom and top of the income distribution, which may also be linked to measurement errors.  
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Goals, is the international $1.9-day poverty line (in 2011 prices), which basically corresponds to 
the national poverty line of the poorest nations, corrected for 2011 differences in purchasing 
power (Ferreira et al. 2016). Converted in ‘000TSH, this yields: z=406 for our 2010 Kagera 
population. It puts us in scenario (24) in Table 1 (wr < z < wos < woc < ws < wc ) .   
The observed poverty headcount gradient across our population is: P0_r= 0.56 > P0_s= 
0.25 > P0_c= 0.08. For the poverty gap, we find: P1_r= 0.17, and P1_s= 0.07, and P1_c=0.01. This 
suggests a clear poverty gradient declining from rural to town to city.9 Finally, according to (34), 
the creation of an additional formal wage job in town would be more poverty reducing than the 
creation of an additional formal job in the city if 1/es > 1/ec or if ec>es. With ec=0.222 and 
es=0.189, the model would favor formal wage job creation in the towns. While overall 5.3 more 
poor people would be lifted out of poverty with one additional formal wage job in town, 
according to the model, 4.5 more poor people would be lifted out of poverty for an additional 
formal wage job in the city. This is because formal job generation in town induces a larger 
migrant flow out of the rural areas than job generation in the city, which the model links to 1) 
differences in migration costs; and 2) differences in the informal-formal wage gap in towns and 
cities.  
While there is no direct information on migration costs, reported one-way transport costs 
are on average twice as high to the city as to the towns (47,140 TSH vs 23,346 TSH respectively) 
and migrants to towns are 8 percentage point more likely to have found work before moving than 
migrants to city, illustrating differences in search costs. Reliance on friends and family for the 
first residence was also much more important for city migrants (56 percent) than for town 
migrants (30 percent) who were more likely to own a dwelling (32 percent versus 16 percent in 
cities) or have housing provided by the employer (8 percent, versus 2% in cities). In each case 
about 30 percent rented a dwelling. Overall, this suggests higher settlement barriers for city 
migrants, and a greater role of family and friends to overcome them. As distance reduces the 
likelihood of a first mover, and thus the likelihood of having family and friends far away, 
migration costs to cities are bound to increase, or poorer households may simply be locked out 
(McKenzie et al., 2010; Beegle et al., 2011; Bryan, Chowdhury, Mobarak, 2014).  
While these calculations abstract from other consideration such as differences in the cost 
of formal job creation and further spillover effects, they illustrate the empirical relevance of the 
model and the different feature affecting the poverty reducing effects of formal job creation in 
different urban locations. Different poverty lines and urban definitions could further be taken. 
Considering only Dar as a city (and Mwanza as a secondary town or secondary city, as is 
typically done) would for example reinforce the notion that job generation in towns could be 
more poverty reducing in Tanzania’s current context. Based on the model’s findings (and thus 
abstracting from differences in the costs of employment generation and spillover effects), one 
additional formal wage job in Dar would lift 3.36 poor people out of poverty (ec=0.296), though 
5.74 (es=0.174) when created in the town (including Mwanza in this case).  
                                                          
9 The slight deviation from the model’s prediction, whereby poverty levels in town and city are equal (Pα,r >Pα,s = 
Pα,c) follows from the fact that the income distribution in the respective destinations contains in practice more than 
two income profiles (formal and informal), contrary to what is assumed in the model.  
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6. Heterogeneous Migrants and Jobs 
 
 In the spirit of the basic Todaro model, the previous sections assume that the migrants are 
identical. But the empirical example already alludes to the fact that there is bound to be 
heterogeneity and a major strand in the migration literature has relaxed this assumption and 
considered the consequences, for example, when agents in the rural area differ by wealth or by 
education. How would such a complication affect the analysis of poverty gradients and job 
creation and poverty reduction? We show below that although the results are further 
complicated, they maintain their basic structure and economic intuition. 
 
 Let us consider the situation where migrants and jobs are segmented by education or skill 
level.  The distinction is indicated by superscript “a” for advanced education and superscript “b” 
for basic education.  There are separate labor markets and migration streams for each type of 
labor.  Total population is now 
          
  𝑁𝑁 = 𝑁𝑁𝑎𝑎 + 𝑁𝑁𝑏𝑏  
 
      = [𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑎 + 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 + 𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎] + [𝑁𝑁𝑟𝑟𝑏𝑏 + 𝑁𝑁𝑠𝑠𝑏𝑏 +  𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐𝑏𝑏]   (41) 
 
But the migration streams of a and b types are segmented and follow their own logic, comparing 
the costs and benefits of migration to small towns and cities. 
 
 The returns and costs to migration are now superscripted by a and b to distinguish 
between the two types of labor.  We assume that the pattern of wages set out in (18), (19) and 
(22) holds for each type of labor – in other words with superscripts a and b respectively for 
advanced and basic education.10  Further, we assume that each wage for advanced exceeds the 
corresponding wage for basic and that the transport costs of a are less than the transport costs of 
b.  With this specification, the equilibrium conditions set out in (12) and (13) are simply 
replicated with superscripts a and b.  Thus the equilibrium values (14) – (17) are also replicated 
with superscripts a and b. 
 
 Since we assume that each wage for type a exceeds each corresponding wage for type b, 
poverty within group a will be lower than poverty within group b:  
 
  𝑃𝑃α𝑎𝑎 < 𝑃𝑃α𝑏𝑏 (42) 
 
Overall poverty Pα is simply a population weighted sum of poverty among a and b types: 
                                                          
10 This assumption finds empirical support in Figure 1, which shows that the income gradient (informal rural to 
informal town, informal city, formal town and formal city) is retained across most of the income distribution. To the 
extent that heterogeneity in ability coincides with the ranking position in the income distribution (say the 20th 
percentile for those with basic and the 80th percentile for those with advanced education), it can then be seen that the 
income gradient is replicated for both low and high performers.   
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  Pα  =  �
𝑁𝑁
𝑎𝑎
𝑁𝑁
� 𝑃𝑃α
𝑎𝑎 + �𝑁𝑁𝑏𝑏
𝑁𝑁
� 𝑃𝑃α
𝑏𝑏 (43) 
 
The poverty gradients for (𝑃𝑃α,r𝑎𝑎  , 𝑃𝑃α,𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎  , 𝑃𝑃α,c𝑎𝑎 ) and (𝑃𝑃α,r𝑏𝑏  , 𝑃𝑃α,s𝑏𝑏  , 𝑃𝑃α,c𝑏𝑏  ) are determined by the same 
arguments as used for comparing (26), (27) and (28) when wages for each type a and b lie in the 
relation (24).  In this case there is a poverty gradient for each type, with poverty decreasing from 
rural to secondary town to city.  When wages in relation to the poverty line are given by (29) for 
each type, the gradient depends on the relative values of (30), (31) and (32) for each type.  If the 
unemployment (or informality) rate for each type is lower in the city than in the town, then we 
will again have a declining poverty gradient from rural to town to city.  Of course, if each type a 
and b has a declining poverty gradient, then overall poverty will also show this gradient. 
 
 The poverty impact of job creation in the secondary town or the city, by type a or b, is 
now given analogously to (34): 
 
     
  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
α
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖 ⋛
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑α
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗       
     <=> 
  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 ⋛ 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗        ;     𝑗𝑗 = 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠, 𝑐𝑐              (44) 
 
 As in the discussion of (34), the relative poverty impact of modern job creation in one of 
the four sub-sectors specified by i = s, c and j = a, b is given by the relative modern employment 
rate in that sector.  For scenario (29), the analogy is with (35) – (39).  In this case the equivalent 
expression to (39) can be written as  
 
  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 ⋛
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑1
𝑑𝑑𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗                                         
  
   <=> 
  
  𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗 ⋛ 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗      ;     𝑗𝑗 = 𝑎𝑎, 𝑏𝑏
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐, 𝑠𝑠  
         
Thus the efficacy of job creation by location and education level is captured by the four 
sufficient statistics 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑗𝑗  , analogously to the two sufficient statistics in (39). The basic structure of 
the policy rule is maintained in this more complicated setting with heterogeneous migrants and 
jobs. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
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In this paper we first extended the basic Todaro-type model of rural-urban migration to 
the case of migration from rural areas to two potential destinations, secondary town and big city, 
and derived conditions under which a poverty gradient from rural to town to city will exist as an 
equilibrium phenomenon. We then addressed the motivating question: Should public investment 
be targeted to big cities or to small towns, if the objective is to minimize national poverty? 
We have shown that the answer to this question is not self-evident and depends on the 
migration response (which in turn depends on the migration cost and the difference in the 
informal-formal wage gaps between the town and the city), where the poverty line lies relative to 
incomes in the three locations, and at times also the poverty index. We developed sufficient 
statistics for the policy decisions based on these income parameters and illustrated the empirical 
relevance of this model with an example of a long running panel from rural Kagera, Tanzania, 
which represents a natural migration equilibrium, and thus an ideal platform to give empirical 
content to the model and explore its relevance in practice. Further, we showed that the structure 
of the sufficient statistics is maintained in the case where the model is generalized to introduce 
heterogeneous workers and jobs.  
Together these results show that the common consideration of urban areas in the 
aggregate foregoes important dimensions of these urban areas, which can have an important 
bearing on the poverty outcomes of urban investment. More analysis of the distributional effects 
of urban investment, which explicitly incorporates such disaggregation is called for. This paper 
has taken one step in that direction.  
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